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Abstract
This Article will focus on how lawyers in countries with a tradition of bank secrecy have
played a part in maintaining their clients’ anonymity vis-a`-vis bankers. For comparative purposes
the Article will also comment on the banker’s interest in knowing his or her customer’s identity
in a tax context, particularly when the customer claims the benefits of income tax treaties. My
modest purpose is to help us all to be more aware of the divergent ethical implications of bank
account anonymity.
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There is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about,
and that is not being talked about.
INTRODUCTION
Oscar Wilde's observation about humankind's proclivity
toward public recognition does have exceptions. For a variety
of reasons, men and women throughout the world have often
sought confidentiality in their financial affairs, chiefly through
banking in jurisdictions with a tradition of bank secrecy. Usu-
ally the depositor seeks the assurance that the banker will not
disclose account information to curious tax inspectors, anxious
creditors, and intrusive relatives.
On occasion, the depositor may seek to hide his identity
from the bank itself, as well as from third parties. To this end,
an account may be opened in the name of an offshore shell
corporation. Sometimes called a "letterbox company," such
an entity often has no staff of its own, and no premises other
* Professor of Law, Boston University; Director, Morin Center for Banking Law
Studies, Boston University; Counsel, Ropes & Gray, Boston. B.A., Yale University;
J.D., Columbia University; M.A., Cambridge University. A version of this Article was
presented at the Stein Institute of Law and Ethics Conference on the International-
ization of the Practice of Law at Fordham University School of Law on October 11,
1991.
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 2 (Isabel Murray ed., Oxford
University Press 1974) (1891).
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than a rented post office box.2 The account might also be
opened in the name of an attorney acting as agent for the un-
disclosed true account owner.
Those who seek confidentiality are not a homogeneous
group. Banks organized in jurisdictions with strict secrecy
laws, such as Switzerland and Luxembourg, have attracted cus-
tomers that range from garden variety tax cheats to victims of
Nazi persecution, and from dictators and gangsters to manag-
ers of legitimate export/import businesses.
Perhaps the most common profile of the individual who
values bank secrecy is that of the international merchant living
in a country with political instability, weak currency, and run-
away inflation. For obvious reasons, such an individual will be
anxious to have some assets beyond the reach of exchange
controls and potential spoliation by his own government.' He
may be a member of a religious or racial minority that has al-
ready suffered, or seen others suffer, from discriminatory ex-
propriations .'
Bank secrecy has become a hot topic for discussion pri-
marily in the context of worldwide concern about the launder-
ing of narco-dollars.' The press has focused chiefly on the
complex ways in which megabuck drug-trafficking touches
bankers. Especially since news of the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI) scandal captured the public atten-
tion, even those who are not specialists in the area have shown
keen interest in the role of bankers in money-laundering.
What has been relatively neglected, however, is the lawyer's
2. Another common term for such entities is "domiciliary" companies, so-
named because of their practice of electing to be domiciled in the offices of an ac-
commodating lawyer or accountant.
3. For a brief discussion of how exchange controls operate, see FRITZ A. MANN,
THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 355-56, 357-71 (4th ed. 1982).
4. The relative stability of both the U.S. dollar and the U.S. political system has
led some in the United States to forget that similar blessings are not always found in
other parts of the world. Europe in the 1930s and many of the developing nations of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America should remind us of the pervasive suffering engen-
dered by political, social, and economic instability.
5. See Your Friendly Neighborhood Cleaners, TIME, Dec. 18, 1989, at 50. For discus-
sion of the mechanics of alleged money laundering in a recent case, see accounts of
the Rhode Island "coin shop connection" in Bruce D. Butterfield, The Coin Shop Con-
nection, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 1991, Metro/Region, at 1, and Peter G. Gosselin &
John H. Kennedy, Money-Laundering Ring Halted, U.S. Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26,
1991, Metro/Region, at 1, 31.
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role in money laundering. In at least two ways, members of
the legal profession have participated in the process of re-
cycling narco-dollars by obscuring identification of the real
beneficial owners of bank accounts. First, lawyers have as-
sisted in the creation and the upkeep of corporations designed
to add a screen of anonymity between the banker and the cli-
ent, often providing both premises and staff to companies
whose creation they have counseled and implemented. Sec-
ond, attorneys in some jurisdictions have opened bank ac-
counts on behalf of clients whose true identities have not been
disclosed to the financial institution.
This Article will focus on how lawyers in countries with a
tradition of bank secrecy have played a part in maintaining
their clients' anonymity vis-d-vis bankers. For comparative pur-
poses the Article will also comment on the banker's interest in
knowing his or her customer's identity in a tax context, partic-
ularly when the customer claims the benefits of income tax
treaties. My modest purpose is to help us all to be more aware
of the divergent ethical implications of bank account anonym-
ity.
I. NARCO-DOLLARS AND MULTILATERAL NORMS
Legal norms are often responses to problems with particu-
lar temporal or geographical limits. Laws against cattle rus-
tling are more to be expected in farm states than in large urban
areas. Piracy on the high seas is more likely to be a concern of
sea-faring peoples than of mountainous, land-locked folks.
And laws against money laundering have arisen in a world
where drug barons establish multinational enterprises by re-
cycling their profits through banks in countries known for their
traditions of bank secrecy.
Drug runners are usually motivated not by the need to
show an expertise in identifying various powders, but rather by
the more primitive satisfaction that comes from making
money.6 For this reason, governments struggling against the
6. I am reminded of the eight jurisprudential value categories elaborated by
Yale Professor Myres McDougal: power, wealth, respect, well-being, affection, skill,
enlightenment, and rectitude. In the vocabulary of this New Haven school of juris-
prudence, one might say that "wealth," rather than "skill," is the drug runner's core
value. See AARON M. SCHREIBER & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDER-
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narcotics plague have decided to chase money as well as pow-
der.
In the United States, the crime of money laundering in-
cludes the conduct of a financial transaction involving the pro-
ceeds of illegal activity, when the transaction is intended to
conceal the source of ownership of the illicitly obtained funds."
European national statutes use different words to characterize
the crime, but with roughly the same thrust.'
Where the Americans and the Europeans diverge, how-
ever, is in the practical implementation of their respective ini-
tiatives to catch the crooks. The United States focuses on get-
ting banks to report cash transactions. Monetary transaction
reporting rules require banks to report transactions in cur-
rency exceeding US$10,000. 9 In many European countries,
STANDING AND SHAPING LAw 583 (1987) (quoting Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. Mc-
Dougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971)).
7. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988). This stat-
ute punishes by fine or imprisonment, for up to twenty years,
[w]hoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction rep-
resents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts
to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful ac-
tivity...
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law.
Id. § 1956(a)(1).
Two years later, U.S. measures against money laundering were strengthened by
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Title
VI of this act is the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988. Id., 102 Stat. 4312.
Subtitle E of this act is the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of
1988. Id., 102 Stat. 4354. This act amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988) and
added 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1988). The civil and criminal forfeiture sanctions for laun-
dering money added by the acts permit the Attorney General to seize any property
involved in a violation or attempted violation of section 1956 or 1957 of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code.
See generally Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAw. 69 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Loi No. 90-614, Relative i la Participation des Organismes Financiers
A la Lutte Contre le Blanchiment des Capitaux Provenant du Trafic des Stup6fiants,
1990 J.O. 8329, corrected by 1990 J.O. 13,327 (Fr.); CP art. 305 Bis (Switz.); Criminal
Justice (International Co-operation) Act of 1990, ch. 5, § 14 (U.K.); Drug Trafficking
Offenses Act of 1986, ch. 32 (U.K.).
9. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5323 (1988), and particularly sections 5313 and 5316,
655
656 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:652
however, the use of large amounts of cash for legitimate trans-
actions is commonplace. The focus among national and inter-
national banking supervisory groups, therefore, has been more
on making sure the banker knows the real customer-the ulti-
mate beneficial owner of the account-so that the banks them-
selves can take prophylactic measures to keep drug traffickers
from ever having bank accounts at all.' °
The latest multilateral pronouncement about knowing
one's customer is a European Community ("EC") Council Di-
rective of June 10, 1991. The directive requires Community
financial institutions to ascertain "the real identity of the per-
sons on whose behalf the customers are acting.""II
Outside the EC framework, two other important multilat-
eral policy statements have reaffirmed the banker's duty to
know his customer.12 First, the statement of principles issued
in 1988 by the twelve countries that constitute the so-called
"Basle Committee"' t 3 prohibits banking activity with a cus-
tomer who will not provide identification of the account
owner. 4 Second, in 1990 a multilateral financial action task
force issued a report on the drug trafficking problem that con-
implemented by 31 C.F.R. § 103.22, which originally constituted Title II of the some-
what ironically named Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.
10. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing CP art. 305 Ter
(Switz.)). This is not to say that U.S. authorities are insensitive to the importance of
having bankers know their customers. Quite the contrary. For example, the Comp-
troller of the Currency publication on money laundering states: "Firm know your cus-
tomer and know your employee policies are a bank's most effective weapon against being
unwittingly used to launder money." Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Money Laundering: A Banker's Guide to Avoiding Problems 7 (Supervision Policy/Re-
search, Dec. 1989).
The report then goes on to list suspicious transactions of which a banker should
beware, many of which involve large amounts of cash. However, the United States
has not yet enacted its general policy admonitions into positive law.
11. Council Directive No. 91/308, art. 3(5), O.J. L 166/77, at 80 (1991). The
know-the-customer requirement applies not only when accounts are opened, but at
the time of any transaction over 15,000 ECU. Based on a basket of European curren-
cies, one ECU was valued at about US$1,27 in May 1992.
12. Other related multilateral initiatives not discussed here include the Council
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Pro-
ceeds from Crime, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991), and the U.N. Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/
Conf. 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
13. See Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Pre-
vention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering [hereinaf-
ter Basle Committee Principles], reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11,785 (1988).
14. Id. art. II.
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tained proposals to reduce laundering of drug money.' 5
The Financial Action Task Force was set up in 1989 at the
heads of state summit of the so-called "Group of 7" major in-
dustrialized nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus the EC
Commission. The "G-7" were augmented for this purpose by
another seven countries, including Switzerland.' 6 The Task
Force recommendations called explicitly for increased dili-
gence by financial institutions in ascertaining the true benefi-
cial owners of the bank accounts.' 7
Luxembourg, both an important secrecy jurisdiction and a
member of the EC, has already put in place its own national
"know your customer" rules. The Luxembourg banking au-
thorities-the Institut Monitaire Luxembourgeois ("IML")-have
issued a circular letter" to banks licensed in Luxembourg
which draws banks' attention to the fact that the Luxembourg
anti-money laundering legislation punishes "any failure in pro-
fessional duty" that would result in a grant of assistance to a
financial operation designed to hide the origin of funds from
sale of illegal drugs.' 9
In application of this general principle, the IML instructed
banks to verify the identity of all customers, both individual
and corporate, so as to determine the ultimate beneficial
owner 20 of any intermediate juridical entity that might be used
as a screen, including holding companies, trusts, and founda-
tions. 2' The IML also requires banks to refuse to open an ac-
count in any case in which the bank "encounters difficulties" in
15. See generally La Lutte Contre le Blanchiment de Capitaux,. Paris, 7 February 1990
[hereinafter Task Force Report]. The English language version was published under
the title Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Report.
16. The recently added countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
17. Task Force Report, supra note 15, recomm. 13.
18. Institut Montaire Luxembourgeois, Blanchiment d'Argent Provenant du Trafic
de Ia Drogue, Circulaire IML 89/57 (Nov. 15, 1989) [hereinafter IML Circular].
19. See Loi du 7 juillet 1989 Portant Modification de. la Loi Modifi~e du 19
F~vrier 1973 Concernant la Vente de Substances M~dicamenteuses et la Lutte
Contre la Toxicomanie (Lux.), cited in IML Circular, supra note 18, at 1.
20. The concept rendered as "beneficial owner" in English is ayant droit
iconomique, in the original French, which translates literally as "he who has the eco-
nomic right."
21. Anstalts and stiftungs, creatures of some European legal systems that are little
known to Anglo-American lawyers, are included.
6571991-1992]
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the verification of a potential customer's identity.22
II. THE SWISS EXPERIMENT
Although not an EC member, Switzerland has established
a comprehensive system designed to ensure that bankers know
the origin of the money or securities deposited with them.2 3
Switzerland has explicitly criminalized banker carelessness in
determining the ultimate beneficial owner of accounts. More-
over, the Swiss have set in place a procedure by which bankers
must identify the real owner of accounts opened in the name of
so-called "letterbox companies." 'The Swiss regime is based
on the assumption that a custodian of valuables is in fact able
to ascertain the real economic owner of the property in ques-
tion. Whether this assumption is realistic or naive depends of
course on the context of its application.
Switzerland's money laundering rules entered into force
almost a year before the EC directive was adopted. Swiss Code
penal article 305 Bis punishes actions that tend to thwart the
identification of the origin of what the Code calls valeurs pa-
trimoniales, which might best be translated as "valuables," and
includes cash, securities, jewels, and precious metals. 24 The
offence covers cases in which the offender-the person helping
to obscure the origin of the valuables-knows, or should have
known, that the assets had their source in a crime. An English
translation of the section reads as follows:
1. Whoever undertakes an action tending to thwart the
identification, the discovery, or the seizure of valuables
which he knows, or must assume, stem from a crime will be
punished with imprisonment or a fine.
2. In serious cases the punishment will be up to five years
penal servitude or imprisonment. This sentence will be
combined with a fine up to one million Swiss francs.
22. IML Circular, supra note 18, at 4.
23. For a discussion of the Swiss Code p~nal Section 305 Ter and the Convention
de Diligence, see discussion infra notes 29-40.
24. CP art. 305 Bis (Switz.). Switzerland also provides for forfeiture of amounts
gained in illegal drug trafficking. However, the burden of proving that the suspicious
amounts were gained in illegal activities seems to be on the government, which
means that a drug dealer who has a respectable job as a sideline may end up keeping
the profits of his drug operation unless they can be specifically traced to the illicit
activity. See generally Shelby R. du Pasquier & Andreas von Planta, Money Laundering in
Switzerland, 18 INT'L Bus. LAw. 394 (1990).
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A case is especially serious when the perpetrator
a. acts as a member of criminal organization;
b. acts as a member of a gang which has formed for
the purpose of systematic money laundering;
c. becomes a money launderer by trade and by doing
so attains a large turnover or a considerable profit.
3. The perpetrator will also be punished if the main crime
was committed in a foreign country and if it is also punish-
able where it was committed.2 5
The legislation covers the laundering of proceeds of a fel-
ony but not proceeds of a misdemeanor.26 Characterization of
the offense must be made according to Swiss law. Thus, a
banker would normally be under no duty to reject financial
transactions involving the fruit of insider trading, which is only
a misdemeanor in Switzerland, 27 unless the insider trading also
involved a related felony such as fraud (escroquerie).28
In addition to this plain vanilla prohibition on money
laundering, Switzerland also punishes the acceptance of de-
posits by a banker (or anyone who helps invest or transfer valu-
ables on a professional basis) without the use of care in identi-
fication of the beneficial owner of the valuables. 29 The stan-
25. The French original of article 305 Bis reads as follows:
1. Celui qui aura commis un acte propre i entraver l'identification de
l'origine, la d ouverte ou la confiscation de valeurs patrimoniales dont il
savait ou devait presumer qu'elles provenaient d'un crime, sera puni de
l'emprisonnement ou de I'amende.
2. Dans les cas graves, ia peine sera la rclusion pour cinq ans au plus ou
'emprisonnement. La peine privative de libert6 sera cumui6e avec une
amende d'un million de francs au plus. Le cas est grave, notamment lorsque
I'auteur.
a. Agit comme membre d'une organisation criminelle;
b. Agit comme membre d'une bande forme pour se livrer de mani~re
syst~matique au blanchissage d'argent;
c. R~alise un chiffre d'affaires ou un gain importants en se livrant au
blanchissage d'argent par m6tier.
3. L'auteur sera 6galement puni lorsque l'infraction principale a &6 corn-
mise i l'6tranger et qu'elle est aussi punissable dans l'Etat o6i elle a t6
perp~tr~e.
26. The distinction between a crime (felony) and a delit (misdemeanor) turns on
whether the jail sentence is characterized as prison (emprisonnement) or hard labor (r-
clusion).
27. The dilit of opirations dinitigs is set forth in CP art. 161 (Switz.).
28. See id. art. 148.
29. Id. art. 305 Ter.
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dard of culpability seems to be one of negligence, calling for
"care appropriate to the circumstances":
Whoever on a professional basis accepts, preserves, helps to
invest or to transfer assets of another and does not, with
care appropriate to the circumstances, verify the identity of
the beneficial owner, will be punished by imprisonment for
up to one year, by attachment of assets or by fine.30
Swiss law is thus much stricter than U.S. law in this re-
spect. A banker who fails to use due diligence in determining
the ultimate beneficial owner of a bank account risks a year in
jail.
To strengthen the enforcement of Switzerland's anti-
money laundering measures, the Swiss Federal Banking Com-
mission in April 1991 issued directives mandating the termina-
tion of anonymous bank accounts. The context for under-
standing this development and its impact on Swiss lawyers lies
in the Convention Relative d l'Obligation de Diligence des Banques
("CDB"),3 1 which is a privately sponsored code of conduct con-
tained in an agreement among Swiss banks, and administered
by the Swiss Bankers Association.32
The CDB requires Swiss bankers to identify the ultimate
beneficial owner of an account before opening it. This in-
cludes not only physical persons, but also any shell company
without premises or employees of its own. The CDB "know-
your-customer" procedures 33 require banks to identify the
beneficial ownership of account-holders by completing a docu-
ment called "Form A."93 4
30. Id. The French original of CP 305 Ter reads:
Celui qui, professionnellement, aura accept6, conserv6, aid6 A placer ou
transf6rer des valeurs patrimoniales d'un tiers et qui aura omis de v6rifier,
conform6ment la vigilance requise par les circonstances, l'identit6 de
I'ayant droit &onomique, sera puni de 'emprisonnement pour une ann6e
au plus, des arrts ou de l'amende.
3 1. See Swiss Bankers Association, Convention Relative d l'Obligation de Diligence des
Banques [hereinafter CDB]. The CDB might be literally translated as the "Agreement
on the Banks' Duty to Exercise Due Diligence." See generally Carlo Lombardini, The
1987 Agreement on the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice
of Banking Secrecy, 5J. INT'L BANKING L. 84 (1990).
32. Violation is punishable by a fine of up to ten million Swiss francs, or about
US$7 million at today's exchange rates. See CDB, supra note 31, art. 11.
33. The current version entered into force onJuly 1, 1987 for a five-year period.
34. Article 2 of Form A requires verification of identity in cases of deposit and
passbook (livret) accounts, securities accounts, fiduciary transactions, safe-deposit
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The CDB explicitly requires identification of the beneficial
owner of what it calls "domiciliary companies"-socits de domi-
cile-commonly called "shell entities," "screen companies," or
"letterbox companies." 5 Usually such corporate entities that
are set up principally to serve as a screen for a family or an
individual have neither staff nor premises of their own, but
rather rely on the employees and the offices of outside lawyers
for these purposes. Information about the account's beneficial
owner is recorded on Form A.3 6
A cautious banker will also monitor account activity, even
after the Form A has been completed, in order to check for
suspicious transactions that are either unusual or oddly com-
plex, including large cash deposits, wire transfers made in a
quick "in/out" turnaround fashion, and commercially unjusti-
fiable letters of credit, guarantees or back-to-back loans. In
their annual report to the Federal Banking Commission, a
bank's external auditors are asked to indicate any instances in
which the audited bank has violated the CDB.3 7
Until recently, the CDB know-your-customer rules have
had a significant escape hatch. Lawyers could substitute them-
selves for the real account owner by signing another docu-
ment-the "Form B"-which stated that the lawyer knew the
identity of the account's beneficial owner, but could not dis-
close this identity because of the attorney-client privilege. 8
The signer of Form B was required to declare absence of any
box rental and cash transactions above 100,000 Swiss francs. Form A is reproduced
as an Appendix to this Article.
35. The term sociit& de domicile, which is defined in section 25 (a subdivision of
article 4) of the CDB, supra note 31, reflects the fact that such entities often have their
headquarters, which is to say their legal domicile, at the offices of a lawyer or ac-
countant. The frequently used expression "letterbox company" reflects a different
reality, which is that a shell corporation often has no premises other than a letterbox
in a tax haven.
36. The concept rendered "beneficial owner" in English is ayant droit iconomique
in the original French and wirtschaftlich Berechtigter in the original German. The CDB
requires only identification of the beneficial owner, not verification of the owner's
identity by means of any particular document such as a passport.
It is worth noting that bearer shares are common with sociltis de domicile. A pru-
dent banker should require deposit of bearer shares in order to monitor corporate
ownership. Section 32 of article 4 of the CDB requires only that the banker repeat
the identification procedure when there is a change in the signatory powers of a socite
de domicile.
37. CDB, supra note 31, art. 10.
38. See id. Similar privilege was given to certain asset managers acting as fiducia-
1991-1992]
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suspicion that the assets were acquired through criminal activ-
ity.
In the original version of the CDB, the lawyer signing
Form B had to state only that he knew of no illegal transaction
being carried on by the owner of the account.3 9 Some lawyers
reportedly marketed themselves as signers of Form B. A po-
tential customer with an unsavory reputation might be sent by
the banker to an equally unsavory attorney down the street.
The attorney, of course, could sign the declaration stating no
knowledge of the customer's illegal activity, precisely because
the lawyer usually knew nothing at all about the customer's ac-
tivity, legal or illegal.
This abuse led to a change in the CDB and Form B to weed
out attorney-client relationships that were transitory and su-
perficial in nature. The latest version of Form B requires the
lawyer to certify that the lawyer's relationship with the client is
neither provisional in nature, nor aimed primarily at conceal-
ing the name of the beneficial owner of the account. 40
Recently, Swiss lawyers have seen even more dramatic
changes to procedures for opening accounts for clients. On
May 3, 1991, the Federal Banking Commission issued a com-
munique reporting its decision of the previous week to require
banks to end the use of Form B, and to establish the identity of
the beneficial owner of accounts in all but a very limited set of
circumstances. 4 1 As of July 1, 1991, Swiss banks were forbid-
den to accept a Form B from a customer's lawyer or fiduciary.
By September 30, 1992, Form B must be replaced by evidence
ries for the potential bank customers. Form B is reproduced as an Appendix to this
Article.
39. See the 1977 version of the CDB, supra note 31, art. 5(1).
40. CDB, supra note 31, app.
41. Effective July 1, 1991, the decision of April 25, 1991 is titled "Identification de
I'Ayant Droit Economique/Interdiction des Formulaires B," and cites as its legal basis article
3(2) (c) of the Loi F~d~rale sur les Banques et les Caisses d'Epargne, RS 952.0 (1934)
(Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Banking Law] and article 9(3) of a federal banking ordi-
nance, the Ordonnance d'Excution de la Loi sur les Banques et les Caisses
d'Epargne, RS 952.02 (1972) (Switz.). Any existing Form B must be replaced by a
correct Form A by September 30, 1992. For recent commentary, see generally Hor-
ace Gautier, Anonymous Swiss Bank Accounts: The End of a Myth, 10 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9
(1991). See also Carlo Lombardini, The Changing Face of Swiss Banking Law, 1991 DIR-
irrO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 363.
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showing the ultimate beneficial owner of the account.42
The Federal Banking Commission based its decision on
the new article 305 Ter of the Swiss Code penal, which as we
have seen makes it a crime for a bank to accept a deposit with-
out using "care appropriate to the circumstances" to establish
the beneficial owner of the assets. The Commission declared
that continued use of Form B was simply inconsistent with
43these "know-your-customer" obligations.
It is important to note that the Swiss Federal Banking Law
of 1934 requires banks, in order to keep a license, to show
what it calls "irreproachable conduct" (une activiti irrproch-
able).44 Failure to conform to the Federal Banking Commis-
sion's view of the appropriate standard of care in identifying
customers could be evidence of a conduct less than irreproach-
able. This threat of potential loss of license for a bank that
does not comply with the Commission's decision leads one to
expect that the decision will end the use of Form B, at least
until a court decides otherwise.
It should be emphasized that Switzerland has not changed
its bank secrecy provisions requiring bankers to maintain the
confidentiality of the information supplied by the customer.
Some U.S. newspapers carried exaggerated reports of the
42. The Bankin % Commission's decision provided four exceptions for tempo-
rary accounts held by lawyers, to cover:
(i) payments connected with judicial proceedings currently under way,
such as a retainer or an advance on costs;
(ii) amounts the lawyer is holding in an unliquidated estate settlement;
(iii) amounts held in an unsettled divorce case;
(iv) amounts held in escrow related to litigation, for example when the
parties are about to end an arbitration and put the settlement amount in the
hands of a lawyer while awaiting the formal withdrawal of the claim.
43. Article 2.1 of the Banking Commission decision of April 25, 1991 states: "La
r~glementation d'exception de la CDB 1987 concernant l'emploi de formulaires BI
et B2 ne se concilie ni avec le texte, ni avec le but de l'article 305 ter CPS." Article
2.2 then continues:
Par consequent, contrairement i la r~glementation d'exception de l'article 5
CDB 1987, les banques sont d~sormais tenues, en cas de doute, d'6tablir
l'identit6 de i'ayant droit 6conomique d'une fagon exacte au moyen du
formulaire A... mme lorsque celui-ci agit par l'interm6diaire d'un avocat,
d'un notaire, d'un fiduciaire ou d'un g~rant de fortpne.
44. Swiss Banking Law, supra note 41, art. 3(2)(c). On a bank's duty of "ir-
reprochable conduct," see generally Ch.- A. Junod, La garantie dune activiti irriproch-
able--De la surveillance d la tutelle des banques, in BEITRXGE ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BANKENRECHT 91 (Bern, Verlag Stampfli 1987).
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death of bank secrecy in Switzerland.45 For example, one
newspaper stated "Swiss End Secret Bank Accounts."' 46 Noth-
ing could be further from the truth.
Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Banking Law4 7 provides
that a bank director, officer or employee who discloses a bank
secret-such as a customer's identity-can be jailed for six
months.48 Of course, disclosure may be made to a public offi-
cial in the context of a legal inquiry. For example, a Swiss
judge in charge of a rogatory commission might ask questions
on behalf of U.S. authorities making a request for information
under the U.S.-Switzerland mutual judicial assistance treaty.49
What changed in 1991 relates to anonymity, not secrecy.
The banker must now know the customer's real identity, in-
cluding the ultimate beneficial owner of any "letterbox com-
pany" that may be the titular account holder. If the banker has
reason to know that his customer is depositing the proceeds of
illegal activity, the relationship must be terminated.50
45. See, e.g., Swiss End Secret Bank Accounts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1991, at 4.
46. Id. The Swiss Bankers Association issued a special communiqu6 making
clear that secrecy legislation remains in force. For other articles dealing with the
subject, see James Bates, Swiss Phasing Out Secret Bank Accounts, L.A. TIMES, May 4,
1991, at D 1; Steven Mufson, Swiss to End Anonymous Bank Accounts, WASH. POST, May 4,
1991, at A20; Mitya New, Proposed Swiss Laws Seen Toughest Against Money-Laundering,
Reuters, May 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt file; Reuters, Switzer-
land Plans to Abolish Anonymous Bank Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, May. 4, 1991, § 1, at 34.
47. Swiss Banking Law, supra note 41, art. 47.
48. On Swiss bank secrecy, see generally M. AUBERT, J.-P. KERNAN & H.
SCH6NLE, LE SECRET BANCAIRE SUISSE (2d ed. 1982); D. BODMER, B. KLEINER & B.
LuTz, KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESGESETZ UBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN (1976 &
supp. 1988); Peter C. Honegger, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 BuTrERWORTHSJ. INT'L BANK-
ING & FIN. L. 344 (1990).
49. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz.,
27 U.S.T. 2019. See generally P. Bernasconi, Droits et devoirs de la banque et de ses clients
dans la procidure d'entraide judiciare internationale en matire pinale, in BEITRAGE ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BANKENRECHT, supra note 44, at 343.
50. Proposals have been made by the government to authorize bankers to advise
Swiss governmental authorities of doubtful transactions. This would result in a mod-
ification to Code pbnal article 305 Ter to add that "persons covered by this section
[i.e., the duty to know the customer] have the right to communicate to appropriate
Swiss authorities information permitting them to establish that valuables come from
a crime." The French original reads, "Les personnes vises par le premier alin6a ont
le droit de communiquer aux autorit~s suisses comp~tentes les informations leur
permettant d'6tablir que des valeurs patrimoniales proviennent d'un crime." See Of-
fice Fdral du Justice, Modification du Code pinal et du Code penal militaire, Avant-Projet et
Rapport Explicatif 44-50 (1991).
There may already be a principle of "increased diligence" that arises when a
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As one might expect, the reaction of the Swiss bar has not
been universally favorable. Indeed, there has been resistance
by some Helvetic attorneys to several aspects of the Banking
Commission decision. In part, of course, this was to be ex-
pected, because the abolition of Form B removes a source of
income for certain attorneys. However, even some lawyers
who do not depend on Form B for their livelihood perceive
overkill. They believe that the new rules hinder the use of a
law firm account for many normal and innocent transactions.
For example, I might send a Swiss lawyer friend 100 dollars to
buy me the latest treatise of the famous Professor X at the Uni-
versity of Geneva. My friend would normally deposit the
money into his firm's bank account, and make an entry in the
firm's internal accounts indicating that I was a creditor in the
amount of 100 dollars until the book was purchased and sent.
Under the new Banking Commission principles, however,
this transaction could be construed as failure to disclose to the
bank the real beneficial owner of the funds. Until such time as
my friend buys and sends me the books, I am the beneficial
owner of the 100 dollars. But I am not known to the bank.
Book buying, of course, does not fit within Any of the four spe-
cial exceptions for a lawyer's transitory accounts. So it would
seem that my friend should return the money to me or open an
account with Form A completed in my name.
III. FISCAL IMPROPRIETY
It may be instructive to compare the ethical and legal im-
plications of anonymous bank accounts in money laundering
with their role in helping a tax evader to hide income from
fiscal authorities. When we shift our attention from the laun-
dering of narco-dollars to tax evasion, the concerns for ano-
nymity relate to authorities both in the customer's home coun-
try and in the country of the income's source.
Currency instability has led governments in many parts of
the world to impose exchange controls that prohibit their resi-
banker knows or should know that a freeze order is about to be issued to attach a
customer's assets. In such a case, a banker might attempt to hold onto the cus-
tomer's assets for a period of time sufficient to allow the freeze order take effect. See
the Federal Banking Commission's discussion of the devoir accru de diligence in the mat-
ters of the Marcos and Duvalier assets, reported in RAPPORT DE GESTION/JAHRESBER-
ICHT 127-29 (1986).
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dents from having foreign bank accounts without authoriza-
tion. At one point or another since World War II, such con-
trols have been imposed even by our closest allies and trading
partners. In return, currency instability and its attendant ero-
sion of monetary value in some of these countries have led
their residents to persistent efforts to safeguard the financial
fruits of their labor and enterprise.5'
Imagine someone living in a country with exchange con-
trols who has decided to seek hard currency assets and thereby
diversify his portfolio by holding U.S..stocks and bonds, who
asks a Swiss bank to serve as nominee to purchase the securi-
ties. This investor will be concerned not only with minimizing
U.S. tax liability on the investments, but also-and perhaps
more importantly-with the need to keep any tax-related in-
quiries in the United States from coming to the ears of authori-
ties in his home country. For example, to qualify for the spe-
cial exemption from withholding tax on "portfolio interest"
earned by non-U.S. holders of bonds issued by U.S. companies
in registered form,52 interest recipients must provide a Form
W-8 to the U.S. payor, identifying the beneficial owner.5" If
the taxpayer wishes to qualify for treaty benefits on dividend
income, a different form must be filed: this is Form 1001,
which now also requires an indication of the beneficial owner
of the income. 54 The impact of the tax collection process thus
creates for the investor a problem within a problem, because in
the wrong hands either form could create difficulties in the in-
vestor's own country.
For bankers, the need to know the customer's identity in a
tax context often relates to what is called "treaty shopping." A
country with a network of income tax treaties will often find
that non-residents attempt to obtain benefits under its income
tax treaties by the use of banks as nominees, hoping to reduce
51. The European Economic Community, in contrast, is implementing a direc-
tive to abolish such exchange controls. See Council Directive No. 88/361, O.J. L 178/
5 (1988).
52. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (1988).
53. Id. § 871 (h)(2); see 26 C.F.R. 35a.9999-5(b) (1991). Portfolio interest in-
cludes interest on obligations issued afterJuly 18, 1984. It includes neither obliga-
tions held by 10 percent shareholders nor loans entered into by banks in the ordinary
course of their business. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881 (c) (1988).
54. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-6(b) (1991). The Form 1001 was amended in 1990 to
require identification of the person ultimately entitled to the income.
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withholding tax on payments of dividends and interest. For
example, a South American textile merchant living outside
Switzerland might be tempted to ask his Swiss banker, as nomi-
nee, to buy securities issued by a U.S. company, the income
from which would normally be subject to a 30 percent with-
holding tax. Under the U.S.-Switzerland treaty, however, the
dividends and interest would be subject to lower rates, at 15
percent or 5 percent, respectively. The merchant might also
incorporate the No-Tell Finance Company S.A., a Swiss entity
wholly owned by the merchant, designed to achieve the same
tax result.
For forty years, a Swiss federal decree has prohibited just
such treaty abuse. 55 And it is in this context that the banker
must be particularly vigilant to know his or her customer, at
least to the extent of identifying who is or is not entitled to
treaty benefits. When a bank has received dividends or inter-
est which have been subject to a reduced withholding rate
under the U.S.-Switzerland Income Tax Treaty,5 6 any amounts
collected as nominee for the account of a third party are sub-
ject to a supplementary withholding tax at 15 percent (for divi-
dends) or 25 percent (for interest), paid to Swiss tax authori-
ties in Bern, then remitted to U.S. authorities in Washington,
in order to bring the total withholding up to 30 percent. The
decree permits reimbursement of these supplementary with-
holding amounts only to Swiss residents.
From the perspective of the banker, a supplementary with-
55. See Arr~t6 f~dkral concernant l'excution des conventions internationales
conclues par la Confederation en vue d'viter les doubles impositions, 22 June 1951,
and Ordonnance concernant la convention am~ricano-suisse de double imposition, 2
November 1951 [hereinafter Ordonnance]. Article 14 of the Ordonnance imposes a
withholding obligation on a Swiss bank that has received dividends and interest from
U.S. payors who themselves have been subject to an obligation to withhold tax at the
reduced rates of 15 percent for dividends and 5 percent for interest, as provided
under the U.S.-Switzerland Income Tax Treaty, discussed infra text accompanying
note 56, if the Swiss bank collects such amounts as nominee for fiduciary for the
accounts of a third party. Such "supplementary withholding" is paid by the bank to
the Swiss Federal Tax Administration in Bern. Article 17 of the Ordonnance permits
reimbursement of these supplementary withholding amounts to Swiss residents, ex-
cept U.S. citizens resident in Switzerland. See Arr&t du Conseil f~d&al instituant des
mesures contre l'utilisation sans cause I6gitime des conventions conclues par la Con-
f~d~ration en vue d'6viter les duoubles impositions, 14 December 1962, RO 1962,
1680.
56. May 24, 1951, U.S.-Switz., 2 U.S.T. 1751.
57. Article 17 of the Ordonnance, supra note 55, permits reimbursement of these
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holding is a more palatable solution to tax fraud than sending
the customer away altogether. The non-Swiss customer at
least has the option to maintain the confidentiality of the bank-
ing relationship at the price of bearing the full 30 percent
through the supplementary withholding tax. This is particu-
larly important for individuals from countries who do not want
to invoke the income tax treaty of their home countries, for
fear that their own government authorities will discover undis-
closed assets. Traditionally, an important part of the Swiss
banker's clientele includes publicity-shy Frenchmen and
Italians.
CONCLUSION
Sophisticated bankers have come to realize that there can
be little safety for their customers' funds or their shareholders'
equity without safety for the financial institution itself, which in
turn means protecting the integrity of the bank's reputation.
Almost the last thing wanted by depositors seeking confidenti-
ality is to learn that their bank is being investigated on suspi-
cion of money laundering or some other crime, since this usu-
ally triggers snooping by government agents, or official re-
quests for bank files.
The suggestion that lawyers provide assistance to bankers
trying to evade the law is more often likely to be false than
true. Usually, the lawyer's role is to encourage compliance
with complex or poorly drafted legislation that a banker might
otherwise be tempted to ignore. Usually the lawyer's role is to
restrain rather than to facilitate impropriety. For example, the
manager of a U.S. bank may be uncertain about "subpart F" of
the Internal Revenue Code, whose complex provisions tax cer-
tain categories of foreign subsidiary income in the United
States even if never repatriated as a dividend.5" It is the bank's
lawyer who often enlightens the bankers about the extent of
their duty to report such income.59 Thus the international law-
supplementary withholding amounts to Swiss residents other than U.S. citizens, who
are excluded for obvious reasons.
58. See I.R.C. §§ 951-960 (1988).
59. In many countries local statutes prevent foreign (i.e., U. S.) authorities from
conducting investigations on foreign territory. See, e.g., CP art. 271 (Switz.).
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yer more often than not serves as a police officer, and paradox-
ically a police officer paid directly by the potential offender.
Lawyers counseling banks about international transactions
are rarely asked to facilitate illegal or unethical behavior.
Rather, the lawyer's job is to make sure that the multinational
enterprise does not sail too close to the wind with respect to a
plethora of frequently unclear and inconsistent national
norms, as well as its own corporate code of conduct. This usu-
ally calls for multi-dimensional analysis of laws applicable both
at the foreign place of operation and at the home office. One
government may seek to compel disclosure of information
while another prohibits its disclosure. The wise business man-
ager usually will want counsel to err on the side of caution.
Saying "no" to an ethically doubtful deal may result in lost
profits. Saying "yes," on the other hand, may mean damage to
both the corporate reputation and the manager's career.
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APPENDIX A
A Account No.: Holder:
Declaration on opening an account or securities account
(Form A as per Art. 3 and 4 CDB)
The undersigned hereby declares:
(mark with a cross where aoalicable)
0 as holder of the account,
C] that he is the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank,
C] that the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank is:
Full name (or firm) Address/Domicile/Country
(or location of head office)
C] as repregefltatlve of the account holder,
that the following person(s) is/are the beneficial owner(s) of the assets to be deposited with the
bank:
Full name (or firm) Address/Domicile/Country
(or location of head office)
The undersigned takes due note that:
- the banking secrecy privilege protected by Art. 47 of the Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks of
November 8,1934/March 11, 1971 is not unrestricted. The officers, employees and mandataries of the
bank are liable to provide evidence and information vis-a-vis the authorities when required to do so
under federal or cantonal laws (such as during a criminal proceeding). Such an obligation also exists
vis-a-vis foreign authorities, insofar as the Swiss Confederation grants judicial assistance to the
country concerned;
- the system of numbered or coded accounts and deposits is a purely internal measure of the bank and
in no way affects the obligation to provide evidence or to testify to the authorities.
Full name, or firm, if applicable
Exact address
lace ano oate signatureSignaturePlace and date
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APPENDIX B
Account No.: Holder:
Declaration by Swiss attorney or notary
upon opening an account or securities account
(Form B as per Art. 5 CDB)
The undersigned hereby declares:
- that as attorney*/notary ° he is subject to professional secrecy as protected by Art. 321 SPC (Swiss
Penal Code) and governed by the cantonal laws.
He certifies, in said capacity:
- that he is acting as legal counsel in accordance with his appointment as attorney*/notary';
- that the purpose of said appointment is not primarily that of administering assets, whether directly or
indirectly (such as through a company);
- that the account'/securities account* is directly related to the aforesaid appointment;
- that his appointment is not merely temporary in nature and is not primarily aimed at keeping the
beneficial owner's name secret from the bank;
- that the knows the identity of the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank;
- that after having made appropriate, diligent inquiries, he has not learned of any fact that might indicate
that his client or the beneficial owner is abusing the banking secrecy privilege, or, in particular, that the
assets concerned have been acquired through criminal acts;
- that he will supervise the transactions made in the account*/securities account', and will immediately
inform the bank if his powers hereunder are revoked or it the conditions under which this declaration
has been established should change.
The undersigned also duly notes the fact:
- that the bank may be required, in accordance with penal procedures or bilateral judicial assistance, to
report his name to the authorities conducting the inquiry;
- that the bank. the Swiss Bankers Association or an agency set up by the CDB will report him to the
competent regulatory authority for breach of professional' ethics it there is'evidence'that he has
abused his special status.
Full name
Private* or business* address
Place and date Signature
*delete where inapplicable
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B 2 Account No.: Holder:
Declaration by Swiss trustee, fiduciary or asset administrator
upon opening an account or securities account
(Form B as per Art. 5 CDB)
The undersigned hereby declares:
- that he is member of the Swiss Association of Certified Public Accountants, Trustees and Tax
Consultants doing business independently or a member of the Swiss Union of Fiduciary and Auditing
Firms.
He certifies, in said capacity:
- that the account'/securities account* is administered in accordance with a power of attorney
conferred upon him by the beneficial owner or the latter's representative and that the services
furnished by the bank do not play and overriding role in this connection:
- that said power of attorney is not merely tremporary in nature and is not primarily aimed at keeping the
beneficial owner's name secret from the bank:
- that he knows the identity of the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank;
- that after having made appropriate, diligent inquiries, he has not learned of any fact that might indicate
that his client or the beneficial owner is abusing the banking secrecy privilege, or. in particular, that the
assets concerned have been acquired through criminal acts;
- that he will supervise the transactions made in the account*/securities account' and will immediately
inform the bank if his power of attorney is revoked or if the conditions under which this declaration has
been established should change.
The undersigned also duly notes the fact:
- that the bank may be required, in accordance with penal procedures or bilateral judicial assistance, to
report his name to the authorities conducting the inquiry;
- that the bank, the Swiss Bankers Association or an agency set up by the CDB will report him to the
competent regulatory authority for breach of professional ethics if there is evidence that he has
abused his special status.
Full name or firm'
Private' or business* address
Place and date Signature
' delete where inapplicable
